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Abstract

Hybridization is a method invented by Arthur Prior for extending the
expressive power of modal languages. Although developed in interesting
ways by Robert Bull, and by the Soa school (notably, George Gargov,
Valentin Goranko, Solomon Passy and Tinko Tinchev), the method remains little known. In our view this has deprived temporal logic of a
valuable tool.
The aim of the paper is to explain why hybridization is useful in temporal logic. We make two major points, the rst technical, the second
conceptual. First, we show that hybridization gives rise to well-behaved
logics that exhibit an interesting synergy between modal and classical
ideas. This synergy, obvious for hybrid languages with full rst-order expressive strength, is demonstrated for a weaker local language capable of
dening the Until operator we provide a minimal axiomatization, and
show that in a wide range of temporally interesting cases extended completeness results can be obtained automatically. Second, we argue that
the idea of sorted atomic symbols which underpins the hybrid enterprise
can be developed further. To illustrate this, we discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of a simple hybrid language which can quantify over
paths.

1 Introduction
Arthur Prior proposed using modal languages for temporal reasoning more than
40 years ago, and since then the approach has become widespread in a variety
of disciplines. Over this period, a wide range of (often very powerful) modalities
has been used to reason about time. This is unsurprising. After all, dierent
choices of temporal ontology (such as instants, intervals, and events) are relevant for dierent purposes, and (depending on the application) considerable
expressive power may be needed to cope with the way information can be distributed across such structures. But inventing new modalities is not the only
way of boosting modal expressivity. There is a largely overlooked alternative
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called hybridization , and this paper explores its relevance for temporal logic.1
Hybridization is best introduced by example. Consider the following sentence from the language we call ML + 8:
8x(x ! :3x):

The x in this expression is a state variable , and all its occurrences are bound
by the binder 8. Syntactically, state variables are formulas : after all, the expression x ! :3x is built using !, : and 3 in the same way that p ! :3p
is. Semantically, however, state variables are best thought of as terms . Our
semantics will stipulate that state variables are satis ed at exactly one state in
any model. In eect, state variables act as names they label the unique state
they are true at.
The use of `formulas as terms' gives hybrid languages their unique avor:
they are formalisms which blend the operator-based perspective of modal logic
with the classical idea of explicitly binding variables to states. Unsurprisingly,
this combination oers increased expressive power. The above sentence, for
example, is true at any irreexive state in any model, and false at all reexive
ones. No ordinary modal formula has this property.
Now, the language ML + 8 is not the only hybrid language, and for many
purposes it is not the most natural one. One of the key intuitions underlying
modal semantics is locality , and it is intuitively clear (we shall be precise later)
that 8 is not local as our notation suggests, 8 quanti es across all states. So,
if we want a local hybrid language, ML + 8 is not a suitable choice.
But what are the alternatives? To the best of our knowledge only one has
been considered, namely the binder we here call #. Now, # does something
simple and natural: it binds a variable to the current state. Unfortunately,
while ML+ # is a local language, it has two drawbacks. First, it is not expressive
enough for many applications (for example, we shall show that it is not strong
1 The literature on hybrid languages consists of a handful of papers published over the last
thirty years by researchers with very di erent interests. Conning ourselves to the main line
of development, the idea can be traced back Prior (1967), and the posthumously published
Prior and Fine (1977) contains some of Prior's unnished papers on the subject together with
an appendix by Kit Fine. Prior's concerns were largely philosophical technical development
seems to have started with Bull (1970). Bull investigated a hybrid temporal language containing the 8 binder and the universal modality A, and introduced the idea of quantication
over paths. In addition, he initiated the algebraic study of such systems. The paper never
attracted the attention it deserved in fact, apart from citations in the hybrid literature, the
only mention we know of is from Burgess's survey of tense logic:
Other hybrids of a di erent sort | not easy to describe briey | are treated
in an interesting paper of Bull 1970]. (Burgess (1984, page 128)).
(This is probably the rst use of `hybrid' in connection with such languages.) The idea was
independently invented by the Soa School as a spin-o of their investigation of modal logic
with names. The best guide to the Bulgarian tradition is the beautiful and ambitious Passy
and Tinchev (1991), drafts of which were in circulation in the late 1980s. Hybridization is
discussed in Chapter III and deals with Propositional Dynamic Logic enriched with both 8
and the universal modality see also Passy and Tinchev (1985) and the brief remarks at the
end of Gargov, Passy and Tinchev (1987).
Recent papers on the subject include Goranko (1994) (probably the rst published account
of hybrid languages containing the # binder), Blackburn and Seligman (1995), and Seligman (1997) (which investigates hybrid natural deduction and sequent calculi for applications
in Situation Theory), and Blackburn and Tzakova (1998,1998a,1998b). Also relevant are Gargov and Goranko (1993), Blackburn (1993,1994) these look at modal and tense logics enriched
with nominals (in e ect, the free variable fragments of hybrid languages).
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enough to de ne the Until operator). Second, in stark contrast to ML+ 8 which
has an elegant axiomatization, axiomatizing ML + # seems to require complex
proof rules.
What are we to do? Here we show that introducing an operator @ which
retrieves the value stored by # solves these problems: it oers the expressivity
we need, the minimal logic is elegant, and we automatically get completeness
results for a wide class of interesting frame classes, many of which are not
modally de nable. All this without sacri cing locality.2
These results are the technical core of the paper, but to close our discussion
we change gears | there is an important conceptual point to be made about
hybridization and its relevance to temporal logic: hybridization is not simply
about quantifying over states. Rather, hybridization is about handling di erent
types of information in a uniform way. We illustrate this idea by discussing a
simple hybrid language for quantifying over paths.
But we are jumping ahead. There is much to be done before we can usefully
discuss such ideas, so let's call a halt to our introductory remarks and start
developing the idea of hybridization systematically.

2 The basic modal language
One of the simplest languages for temporal reasoning is the propositional modal
language that contains just two modalities: an operator 2 (read as: at all future
states ) together with its dual operator 3 (read as: at some future state ). For
most of this paper we will be working with various hybrid extension of this
simple language (which we will call ML). The purpose of the present section
is to x notation and terminology, to remind the reader of various standard
concepts (in particular, generated submodels and bisimulations ), and to present
a wish-list of properties for hybrid temporal languages.
Given a (countable) set of propositional symbols PROP = fp q r : : :g the
well-formed formulas of ML are de ned as follows:
WFF := p j :' j ' ^  j 2':
Other Boolean operators (_, !, $, ?, >, and so on) are de ned in the usual
way, and we de ne 3' to be :2:'.
ML is interpreted on models . A model M is a triple (S R V ) such that S is a
non-empty set of states , and R is a binary relation on S (the temporal precedence
relation ) the pair (S R) is called the frame underlying M. The valuation V is a
function with domain PROP and range Pow (S ) this tells us at which states (if
any) each propositional symbol is true. Depending on the application, additional
properties may be demanded of R: in temporal logic (various combinations of)
such properties as transitivity, irreexivity, density, discreteness, trichotomy,
no-branching-to-the-right, and many others, are common. We shall deal with
such demands later.
2 Blackburn and Tzakova (1998a), an extended version of the present paper, examines two
other local solutions in detail: (1) adding +1 , a universal quantier over accessible states, and
(2) changing the underlying language from modal logic to tense logic. This version will be
made available at http://www.coli.uni-sb.de/~patrick/. An earlier version which contains
solution (1) is already available.
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The satisfaction de nition for ML is de ned as follows. Let M = (S R V )
and s 2 S . Then:
M s j= p
i s 2 V (p) where p 2 PROP
M s j= :'
i M s 6j= '
M s j= ' ^  i M s j= ' & M s j= 
M s j= 2'
i 8s (sRs ) M s j= '):
0

0

0

If M s j= ' we say that ' is satised in M at s. If ' is true at all states in a
model M we say it is valid in M and write M j= '.
Note the locality of the satisfaction de nition: formulas are evaluated inside
models at some particular state (called the current state), and the 2 and 3
operators scan the states accessible from the current state via the precedence
relation R. This locality intuition is arguably the central intuition underlying
modal approaches to temporal logic it is certainly the intuition which prompted
Arthur Prior to pioneer the \modal logic of time" (which he called tense logic).
As he observed, we are situated inside the temporal ow, and many aspects of
language (for example, the use of tense, and temporal indexicals such as now )
reect this internal perspective. Accordingly, he believed that modal analyses
of temporal logic were likely to be most revealing.3
The locality of ML has an obvious mathematical consequence: satisfaction
of ML formulas is preserved under the formation of generated submodels . To be
more precise, given a model M = (S R V ) and a state s of S , the submodel
of M that is generated by s contains just those states of M that are accessible
from s by a nite number of transitions along R. It follows by an easy induction
that for all formulas ':
M s j= '

i Ms  s j= ':

In what follows, we use preservation under generated submodels as a key criterion for judging hybrid temporal languages. We are interested in local temporal
languages, and will reject hybrid extensions which lead to a loss of the generated
submodel preservation results.
Now for a key question: does ML have the expressivity needed for temporal
reasoning? There is no absolute answer: it depends on the application. For some
applications, ML will often be too strong . For example, if one is interested in
using modal languages to characterize various types of bisimulation invariance, it
may be necessary to work with sublanguages of ML containing no propositional
symbols (ws would be built using the constant ?) or to shed some Boolean
expressivity.
But for many other applications, ML is too weak .4 For a start, as has
already been mentioned, no formula of ML is capable of distinguishing irreexive
from reexive states in all models this means that a fundamental constraint on
temporal precedence simply isn't reected. Moreover, consider the de nition of
The best introduction to Prior's views is Prior (1967).
A very obvious weakness is that ML o ers us no way of looking backwards along R
for that we need Prior's language of tense logic. However, while useful in natural language
semantics, in many applications in AI and theoretical computer science, backward looking
operators don't play a prominent role. Apart from occasional remarks we won't discuss tense
logic here, but Blackburn and Tzakova (1998a), the extended version of the present paper,
contains a full treatment.
3
4
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the Until operator:
M s j= Until('  )

i 9s (sRs & M s j= ' & 8t(sRt & tRs ) M t j= ))
0

0

0

0

This is an extremely natural local operator (note that formulas built using Until
are preserved under the formation of generated submodels) and has proved a useful tool for temporal reasoning in computer science (indeed, computer scientists
usually regard Until as the fundamental modality). However the Until operator
is not de nable in ML. As the non-de nability of both Until and irreexivity
follows from the fact that ML formulas are preserved under bisimulations , and
as we will later make use of special bisimulations called quasi-injective bisimulations , it will be useful to prove these non-de nability results here.
A bisimulation between two models M1 = (S1  R1  V1 ) and M2 = (S2  R2  V2 )
is a non-empty binary relation Z between S1 and S2 such that:
1. For all states s1 in S1 and s2 in S2 , if s1 Zs2 then s1 and s2 satisfy the
same propositional symbols.
2. For all states s1 , s1 in S1 and s2 in S2 , if s1 R1 s1 and s1 Zs2 then there
is a state s2 in S2 such that s2 R2 s2 and s1 Zs2 .
3. For all states s2 , s2 in S2 , and s1 in S1 , if s2 R2 s2 and s1 Zs2 then there
is a state s1 in S1 such that s1 R1 s1 and s1 Zs2 .
The fundamental result concerning bisimulations (which follows straightforwardly by induction on the structure of ML formulas) is that if Z is a bisimulation between models M1 and M2 and s1 Zs2 then s1 and s2 satisfy exactly the
same ML formulas.
It follows that neither Until nor irreexivity is de nable | indeed the following counterexample (which we believe is due to Johan van Benthem) establishes
both points simultaneously. Let M1 be an irreexive model containing just two
states s1 and s2 , let s1 Rs2 and s2 Rs1 , and suppose all propositional symbols
are true at both states. Let M2 be an reexive model containing just one state
s, and suppose all propositional symbols are true at s. Clearly the relation Z
which links both s1 and s2 to s and vice-versa is a bisimulation, hence all states
in both models satisfy exactly the same ML formulas. So, as M1 is irreexive
and M2 reexive, it follows that no ML formula succeeds in distinguishing irreexive and reexive states. Moreover, observe that Until(> ?) is false in M1
(at both s1 and s2 ) but true in M2 . It follows that the Until operator cannot
be expressed in ML.
Thus, ML has expressive weaknesses that are relevant to temporal reasoning,
and one of the key goals of this paper will be to repair them by hybridization.
But what should a hybrid temporal language look like? It is time to draw up a
wish-list.
First, we would like our hybrid language to be local . Second, we would like
our hybrid language to be expressive enough to detect irreexivity and de ne
Until . Third, we would like to nd hybrid languages in which the central ideas
of modal and classical proof systems can be clearly combined. Indeed, we would
like to exhibit a synergy between modal and classical ideas we want the whole,
so to speak, to oer more than the sum of its parts. Let's now examine the two
hybrid binders that have previously been studied and see how they measure up
against these demands.
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
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3 Two hybrid binders
Syntactically, hybridizing ML involves making two changes. First, we sort the
atomic symbols instead of having just one kind of atom (namely the symbols
in PROP) we add a second sort called state symbols . For reasons we shall soon
explain, it is convenient to divide state symbols into two subcategories: state
variables and nominals . Second, we add binders . The binders will be used to
bind state variables, but not nominals or propositional symbols.
Let PROP be as described before. Assume we have denumerably in nite
set SVAR of state variables (whose elements we typically write as u, v, w, x, y
and z ), and a denumerably in nite set NOM of nominals (whose elements we
typically write as i, j , k and l). We assume that PROP, SVAR and NOM are
pairwise disjoint. We call SVAR NOM the set of state symbols , and PROP
SVAR NOM the set of atoms . Choose B to be one of 8 or #. We build the
well-formed formulas of the hybrid language (over PROP, SVAR, NOM, and B )
as follows:
WFF ' := a j :' j ' ^  j 2' j Bx':
Here a 2 ATOM, and x 2 SVAR. If B was chosen to be 8, we obtain the
language ML + 8, and if B was # we get ML + #. (Strictly speaking, dierent
choices of PROP, SVAR and NOM give rise to dierent languages, but we ignore
this whenever possible.)
A full discussion of the syntax of these languages would need to de ne such
concepts as `free', `bound', `substitutable for', and so on. But experience with
classical logic is a reliable guide, and anyway the relevant de nitions may be
found in Blackburn and Tzakova (1998), so we'll simply remark that a sentence
is a formula containing no free variables or nominals, and that we use the notation 's=v] to denote the formula obtained by substituting the state symbol s
for all free occurrences of the state variable v in '.
As promised in the introduction, our hybrid languages use formulas as labels:
in the semantics presented below, both state variables and nominals will be
satis ed at exactly one state in any model. Now, the role of the state variables
should be clear but what is the point of having nominals? Simply this: it is
convenient to have a supply of labels that cannot be bound by the binders
this simpli es some of the technicalities, for it saves us having to worry about
accidental binding. In short, nominals are reminiscent of the `parameters' used
in classical proof theory.
Now for the semantics. The key idea is straightforward: we are going to
insist that state symbols are interpreted by singleton subsets of models. We'll
also need a smooth way to handle the fact that state variables may become
bound, whereas this is not possible for nominals or propositional symbols. But
there is an obvious way to do this: we'll let the state variables be handled by a
separate assignment function in the manner familiar from classical logic.
De nition 1 (Standard models and assignments) Let L be a hybrid language over PROP, SVAR and NOM. A model M for L is a triple (S R V ) such
that S is a non-empty set, R a binary relation on S , and V : PROP NOM ;!
Pow (S ). A model is called standard i for all nominals i 2 NOM, V (i) is a
singleton subset of S .
An assignment for L on M is a mapping g : SVAR ;! Pow(S ). An assignment is called standard i for all state variables x 2 SVAR, g(x) is a singleton
6

subset of S . The notation g x g (g is an x-variant of g) means that g and g
are standard assignments (on some model M) such that g agrees with g on all
arguments save possibly x.
0

0

0

0

Let M = (S R V ) be a standard model, and g a standard assignment. For
any atom a, let V g](a) = g(a) if a is a state variable, and V (a) otherwise.
Then interpretation of our hybrid languages is carried out using the following
de nition:
M g s j= a
M g s j= :'
M g s j= ' ^ 
M g s j= 2'
M g s j= 8x'
M g s j= #x'

s 2 V g](a) where a 2 ATOM
M g s 6j= '
M g s j= ' & M g s j= 
8s (sRs ) M g s j= '):
x g ) M g  s j= ')
8g (g 
x g and g (x) = fsg
M g  s j= ' where g 
Let M be a standard model. We say that ' is valid on M i for all standard
assignments g on M, and all states s in M, M g s j= ', and if this is the case
we write M j= '. We say that a formula ' is valid on a frame (S R) (written
(S R) j= ') i for all standard valuations V and standard assignments g on
(S R), and all s 2 S , (S R V ) g s j= '.
Lemma 2 (Substitution lemma) Let M be a standard model, let g be an
assignment on M , and let ' be a formula of any of the hybrid languages dened
above. Then, for every state s in M , if y is a variable that is substitutable for
x in ' and i is a nominal then:
1. M  g s j= 'y=x] i M  g  s j= ', where g x g and g (x) = g(y).
2. M  g s j= 'i=x] i M  g  s j= ', where g x g and g (x) = V (i).
Proof. By induction on the complexity of '. a
i
i
i
i
i
i

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

This concludes the preliminaries it's time to take a closer look at the binders.

The 8 binder

The 8 binder is the stronger, more classical, of our binders: indeed it's just the
familiar universal quanti er in a modal setting. Note that if we de ne 9x' to
be the dual binder :8x:', then:
xg
M g s j= 9x' i 9g 0 (g 0 

& M g  s j= '):
0

ML + 8 is a powerful language. We saw in the introduction that it can
distinguish irreexive from reexive states. Moreover it can de ne the Until
operator:
Until(' ) := 9y(3(y ^ ') ^ 2(3y ! )):
This de nition says: it is possible to bind the variable y to a successor state
in such a way that (1) ' holds at the state labeled y, and (2)  holds at all
successors of the current state that precede this y-labeled state. In addition,
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the minimal temporal logic of ML + 8 has a simple axiomatization that can be
proved complete reasonably straightforwardly. All in all, it's a lovely language.
But there's a snag: it isn't local. To see that satisfaction of ML+ 8 sentences
need not be preserved under the formation of generated submodels, consider the
following counterexample (taken from Blackburn and Seligman (1995)). Let M
be the following two-element model where S = fs tg, and R = f(s s)g:
9x:3x

s

t

Then 9x:3x is true at s in M, for we can assign the state t to x and (s t) 62 R.
However it is not true at s in the submodel Ms generated by s, for as Ms
contains only the state s, all assignments assign s to x. As s is reexive, :3x
will always be false. In short, 9 detects t from s, even though t and s are
completely disconnected.
If you want a strong hybrid language and are not interested in maintaining
locality, then ML + 8 is probably an excellent choice. Indeed, you may wish to
consider working with a hybrid language even less local, namely ML + 8 enriched with the universal modality A.5 The universal modality has the following
satisfaction de nition: M s j= A' i M s j= ' for all states s 2 M. It is
not hard to see that adding the universal modality yields a hybrid language
with rst-order expressive power (Prior knew this result, and formulated it in
a number of ways). Moreover, the A and 8 work together extremely smoothly,
making elegant axiomatizations possible (see Bull (1970)). But while such rich
systems are interesting, they are far removed from the local temporal languages
we wish to develop.
0

0

The # binder

If one is interested in local hybrid languages, the # binder is the most natural
starting point. Quite simply, # binds a variable to the current state it creates
a label for the here-and-now. Let's look at it more closely.6
First, note that # is self-dual that is, at any state, in any standard model,
under any standard assignment, #x' is satis ed if and only if :#x:' is satis ed
too. To put it another way, we are free to regard # as either a \universal
quanti er over the current state" or as an \existential quanti er over the current
state" as there is exactly one current state, these amount to the same thing.
Next, note that #x' is de nable in ML+ 8 we can de ne it either as 8x(x !
') or 9x(x ^ '), thus ML + # is a fragment of ML + 8. It's quite an interesting
5 Virtually the entire literature on hybrid languages is devoted to such systems. For example, both Bull (1970) and Passy and Tinchev (1991) make use of 8 and A.
6 Incidentally, while # is a relative newcomer to hybrid languages (Goranko (1994) seems to
be the rst published account) essentially the same binder has been introduced to a number
of di erent non-hybrid languages for a wide variety of purposes see for example Richards et
al (1989), Cresswell (1990), and Sellink (1994). Labeling the here-and-now seems to be an
important operation.
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fragment. For a start, sentences of ML+ # are preserved under the formation of
generated submodels. (We leave the simple proof to the reader. Essentially it
boils down to the observation that the only states that # can bind to variables in
the course of evaluation must be states in the generated submodel. For example,
in the previous diagram, if we evaluate a sentence at s, the only state that we
can bind to any variable is s itself ML+# cannot detect t, which is what we
want.) Moreover, adding the # binder boosts the expressive power of ML in
temporally interesting ways. In particular, note that the sentence
#x2:x

is true in a model at a state s i s is irreexive.
Unfortunately, ML + # has two drawbacks. First, there is no obvious way
to provide a complete axiomatization without resorting to a fairly complex rule
of proof.7 Second, for many purposes it simply isn't expressive enough. Let's
examine this second problem more closely.
Although adding # increases the expressive power, Until still isn't de nable. To see why, we make use of the quasi-injective bisimulations introduced
in Blackburn and Seligman (1997). Let us say that states s and s in a model
M = (S R V ) are mutually inaccessible i s is not in the submodel generated
by s and s is not in the submodel generated by s. We then de ne:
0

0

0

De nition 3 (Quasi-injective bisimulations) Let Z be a bisimulation be-

tween M1 and M2 Z is a quasi-injective bisimulation i :
1. For all states s1 , s1 in M1 , and s2 in M2 , if s1 Zs2 and s1 Zs2 , and
s1 6= s1 then s1 and s1 are mutually inaccessible, and
2. For all states s2 , s2 in M2 , and s1 in M1 , if s1 Zs2 and s1 Zs2 , and
s2 6= s2 then s2 and s2 are mutually inaccessible.
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Now, ML + # sentences need not be preserved under arbitrary bisimulations
(the fact that #x2:x picks out irreexive states shows this), but Blackburn
and Seligman show that they are preserved under quasi-injective bisimulations.
That is:

Proposition 1 Let Z be a quasi-injective bisimulation between models M1 and

and let s1 and s2 be states in M1 and M2 respectively such that s1 Zs2 .
Then for all sentences of ML + #, M1  s1 j=' i M2 s2 j='.

M2 ,

We can use this result to show that no sentence of ML + # de nes the Until
operator. To be more speci c, let p and q be propositional symbols. Then, even
over strictly partially ordered models, there is no sentence 'U (p q) of ML + #
7 Blackburn and Tzakova (1997) axiomatize the set of valid ML + # by making use of the
COV rule (see Gargov, Passy and Tinchev (1987), Passy and Tinchev (1991), Gargov and
Goranko (1993)). Unfortunately, the COV rule is rather complex: it employs arbitrarily deep
nestings of modalities.
The only other work on axiomatic systems for #, we know of are Goranko (1994) and
Goranko (1996a). However Goranko's investigations have little bearing on the concerns of the
present paper, for Goranko investigates a language containing both the universal modality
and #. Note that the 8 binder is denable in this language by 8x' := #yA#xA(y ! '), thus
Goranko's language has full rst-order expressive power.
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that is satis ed in a model M at a state s i Until(p q) is satis ed in M at s.
To see this consider the following two models:

p
q

:q

:Until(p q )

p

p

q

:q

Until(p q)

(In both models, the relation we are interested in is the transitive closure of
the relation indicated by the arrows, thus both models are strict partial orders.)
Note that Until(p q) is false in the left-hand model at the root node, and true
in the right-hand model at the root. Hence if some sentence 'U (p q) of ML + #
expressed Until(p q), it would be false at the root of the left-hand model, and
true at the root of the right-hand side one. But this is impossible, for the obvious
`unraveling' relation between the two models is a quasi-injective bisimulation.
Summing up, previously studied hybrid systems don't meet our three wishlist criteria. The 8 binder is interesting and elegant | but to adopt it is to
abandon locality. The # binder is far more promising | binding to the current
state is such an intrinsically modal idea that it deserves further attention. But
can we overcome its expressive weakness? And are there natural ways to avoid
dependence on complex rules of proof? The answer is \Yes". As we shall now
show, we can do this by adding a retrieval operator @ to match the action of #
for two further solutions, consult the extended version of this paper.

4 The @ operator
Suppose we were given a brand new web-browser to test, and we discovered
it had the following limitation: although it allowed us to bookmark URLs, it
didn't allow us to jump to these locations by clicking on the stored bookmark.
Frankly, we wouldn't dream of working with such a browser we'd demand that
this shortcoming be xed right away.
ML+# is rather like this (hopefully non-existent) browser: 3 pushes us
through cyberspace, and # allows us to label the states we visit on our travels
| but ML+# doesn't oer us a general mechanism for jumping to the states we
label. Let's put this right. We shall allow ourselves to construct formulas of the
form @s '. To evaluate such a formula we will jump to the state s labels and
see whether ' holds there in eect, @ will enable us to use the values # has so
carefully stored for us.
Let's make this precise. If s is a state symbol and ' is a formula then @s ' is
a formula. It is possible to think of @ as a binary modality whose rst argument
is a state symbol and whose second argument is a formula | but as will soon
become clear, it is more natural to view the composite symbol @s as a unary
modal operator. If we add all these state-symbol-indexed unary modalities to
ML+#, we obtain ML+#+@. Most syntactic aspects of ML+#+@ are obvious,
10

though the following point is worth stressing: @ does not bind variables. Only
the # binder does that.
Now for the semantics. Let M = (S R V ) be a standard model, let g be a
standard assignment on M, and let Den(s) be the denotation of the state symbol
s (that is, Den(s) is g(s) if s is a state variable, and V (s) if s is a nominal).
Then:
M g t j= @s ' i M g Den(s) j= ':
As promised, @s jumps to the denotation of s and evaluates its argument there.
Sentences of ML+#+@ are preserved under generated submodels. After all,
in a sentence , the only occurrences of @ will be of the form @y , where y is a
state variable bound by some occurrence of #, and as # binds locally, the result
follows. Second, @ can de ne Until .8 As we have already seen, Until is not
de nable in ML+#, but it certainly is in ML+#+@:
Until(' ) := #x3#y@x(3(y ^ ') ^ 2(3y ! )):

Note how this works: we label the current state with x, use 3 to move to an
accessible state, which we label y, and then use @ to jump us back to x. We
then use the modalities to insist that (1) ' holds at the state labeled y, and
(2)  holds at all successors of the current state that precede this y-labeled
state. Note the similarities (and dierences) with our earlier 9-based de nition
of Until .9
As this example shows, # and @ make a great team they communicate
smoothly and their cooperation gives rise to an axiomatization called H# @](K ).
This axiomatization is an extension of the minimal modal logic K . Recall that
K is the smallest set of formulas containing all propositional tautologies, and all
instances of 2(' ! ) ! (2' ! 2), that is closed under modus ponens (if '
and ' !  are both provable, then so is ) and necessitation (if ' is provable
then so is 2'). To the axioms and rules of proof of K we add axioms and rules
governing both # and @. Let's deal with # rst. First, we have all instances of
the following schemas:10
8 A lot more could be said about @, and we can't say it all here. But two things should be
said. First, the reader has almost certainly seen something like @ in non-hybrid languages: for
example it's Prior's T (s ') construct in third grade tense logic , it's the Holds(s ') operator
introduced by Allen (1984) for temporal representation in AI, and it is the characteristic
operator of the Topological Logic of Rescher and Urquhart (1971). Note that the @ operator
supports a variety of natural interpretations: for example, computationally it can be viewed
as a goto instruction.
But one perspective is particularly relevant here: @ can be viewed as a restricted version of
the universal modality . First, note that @s ' can be dened as either A(s ! ') or E (s ^ '),
where E is the dual if A. In short, @ allows limited access to the power of A, and the limitation
results in a generated submodel for sentences. But as we shall see below, @ has enough power
to support elegant proof theories.
9 Note that the prenex block #x3#y @ denes an existential quantier over states reachable
x
in 1 R-step: #1y ' := #x3#y@x ' this binder is discussed in detail in the extended version
of the paper. Similarly, we can dene an existential quantier over states accessible in 2 Rsteps: #2y ' := #x33#y@x '. Indeed, for any natural number n we can dene an existential
quantier over states accessible in n R-steps. Note that we also have simple denitions of the
universal quantiers over states reachable in n R-steps: for example, +2y ' := #x22#y@x '.
It is easy to see that #n and +n are dual binders, for any natural number n.
10 These axioms were used as part of the COV -based axiomatization of Blackburn and
Tzakova (1998). In Blackburn and Tzakova (1998a), the extended version of the present
paper, these axioms are discussed further, and analogs of Q1{Q3 are given for the +1 binder
mentioned in the previous footnote.
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Q1

#v(' !  ) ! (' ! #v )

Q2

#v' ! (s ! 's=v])

Q3

#v(v ! ') ! #v'

Self-Dual #v' $ :#v:'

(Here v is a metavariable over state variables, s a metavariables over state
symbols, and ' and  metavariables over arbitrary ws. In Q1, ' cannot
contain free occurrences of v in Q2, s must be substitutable for v in '.)
Q1 and Q2 are obvious analogs of familiar rst-order axiom schemas. The
major dierence is that the present version of Q2 only lets us substitute state
symbols for binders when the obvious locality condition is ful lled: s must be
true in the current state. This restriction motivates the introduction of Q3,
which allows us to eliminate bound occurrences of state variables in antecedent
position. In addition to these axioms we have the rule of state variable localization that is, if ' is provable then so #x'. Summing up: # supports a local
form of classical reasoning. But in spite of the locality restriction, the axioms
just introduced are strong enough to support many classical principles such as
-conversion. As an illustration (for full details, see the extended version) we
show:

Lemma 4 (Normality) For all formulas ' and  we have:

(#x' ! #x).

` #x(' !  ) !

Proof. Note that #x(' ! ) ! (x ! (' ! )) is an instance of Q2, as is #x' !
(x ! '). Hence ` (#x(' ! ) ^ #x')) ! (x ! ). Use localization to pre x
this formula with #x, and then Q1 to distribute #x over the main implication
to get ` (#x(' ! ) ^ #x') ! #x(x ! ). Note that #x(x ! ) ! #x is
an instance of Q3, so we can simplify the consequent and so obtain the result.
(Using Q3 in this way to simplify the conditionals produced by applications of
Q2 is typical of H# @](K ) proofs.) a

Let's turn to @. For every state symbol s, we have the rule of @s -necessitation
(if ' is provable then so is @s '). In addition we have the rules Paste-0 and
Paste-1 these will be introduced below. In addition, we have all instances of
the following schemas. These fall naturally into three groups. The rst identi es
the basic logic of @.
K
@s(' ! ) ! (@s ' ! @s)
Self-Dual

@s' $ :@s:'

Introduction s ^ ' ! @s '
Note that K is simply the familiar modal distribution schema hence as we
have the rule of @s -necessitation, @s is a normal modal operator. Obviously
Self-Dual states that @s is self-dual but note that, viewed in more traditional
modal terms, it tells us that @s is a modality whose transition relation is a
function : one direction is the modal determinism axiom, while the other is
the characteristic axiom of deontic logic. Given the jump-to-the-labeled-state
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interpretation of @, this is exactly what we would expect. Introduction tells
us how to introduce information under the scope of the @ operator. Actually,
it also tells us how to get hold of such information, for if we replace ' by :',
contrapose, and make use of Self-Dual , we obtain (s ^ @s ') ! ' we call this
is Elimination schema.
The next group is a modal theory of labeling (or to put it another way, a
modal theory of state equality).
Label @ss
Nom

@st ! (@t ' ! @s ')

Swap @st $ @t s
Scope @t @s' $ @s'

The nal group tells us how @ and 3 interact:

3@s' ! @s'
Bridge 3s ^ @s ' ! 3'
Back

And (apart from the Paste rules) that's H# @](K ). We leave the soundness
proof to the reader, and turn straight to the issue of completeness. Essentially
we're going to adapt the modal canonical model method to our new language
(we assume the usual notions of consistency, Maximal Consistent Sets (MCSs)
and so on see the extended version for further details).

De nition 5 (Canonical Models) For a countable language L, the canonical
model Mc is (S c  Rc V c ), where S c is the set of all L-MCSs Rc is the binary
relation on S c dened by ;Rc ! i 2' 2 ; implies ' 2 !, for all L-formulas
' and V c is the valuation dened by V c (a) = f; 2 S c j a 2 ;g, where a is a

proposition symbol or nominal.

We begin by proving a key lemma without the help of the yet-to-be-introduced
Paste rules. Let us say that an MCS is labeled if and only if it contains a state
symbol if a state symbol belongs to an MCS we call it a label for that MCS.

Lemma 6 Let ; be a labeled MCS, and for all state symbols s, let !s be
f' j @s ' 2 ;g.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Then:
For every state symbol s, !s is a labeled MCS that contains s.
For all state symbols s and t, @s ' 2 !t i @s ' 2 ;.
There is a state symbol s such that ; = !s .
For all state symbols s, !s = f' j @s ' 2 !s g.
For all state symbols s and t, if s 2 !t then !t = !s .
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Proof. Clause 1. First, for every state symbol s we have the Label axiom @s s,
hence s 2 !s . Next, !s is consistent. For assume for the sake of a contradiction
that it is not. Then there are 1  ::: n 2 !s such that ` :(1 ^ ::: ^ n ). By
@s -necessitation, ` @s :(1 ^ ::: ^ n ), hence @s :(1 ^ ::: ^ n ) is in ;, and thus by
Self-Dual :@s ('1 ^ ::: ^ 'n ) is in ; too. On the other hand, as 1  ::: n 2 !s ,
we have @s  1  ::: @s n 2 ;. By simple modal argumentation (all we need is the
fact that @s is a normal modality) it follows that @s (1 ^ ::: ^ n ) 2 ; as well,
contradicting the consistency of ;. We conclude that !s must be consistent
after all.
It remains to show that !s is maximal. So assume it is not. Then there
is a formula  such that neither  nor : is in !s . But then both :@s  and
:@s : belong to ;, and this is impossible: if :@s  2 ;, then by self duality
@s : 2 ; as well, and we contradict the consistency of ;. So !s is maximal.
Clause 2. We have @s ' 2 !t i @t@s ' 2 ;. By Scope, @t @s ' 2 ; i
@s ' 2 ;. (We call this the @-agreement property though simple, it plays an
important role in our completeness proof.)
Clause 3. By assumption, ; contains at least one state symbol let us call
it s. If we can show that ; = !s , we will have the result. But this is easy.
Suppose ' 2 ;. Then as s 2 ;, by Introduction @s ' 2 ;, and hence ' 2 !s .
Conversely, if ' 2 !s , then @s ' 2 ;. Hence, as s 2 ;, by Elimination we have
' 2 ;.
Clause 4. Use Introduction and Elimination , much as in the previous clause.
Clause 5. Let !t be such that s 2 !t we shall show that !t = !s . First
observe that since s 2 !t , we have that @t s 2 ;. Hence, by Swap, @s t 2 ;
too. But now the result is more-or-less immediate. First, !t  !s . For if
' 2 !t , then @t ' 2 ;. Hence, as @s t 2 ;, it follows by Nom that @s ' 2 ;,
and hence that ' 2 !s as required. A similar Nom -based argument shows that
!s  !t . a

This lemma gives us a lot | in essence it says that the subscripted @ operators in any labeled MCS index a well-behaved collection of labeled MCSs.
Now, thinking ahead to the Truth Lemma we will have to prove, it should be
clear why we want to work with labeled MCSs: with the help of Q2 , we can
use these labels to instantiate state variables bound by #, and hence establish
the inductive step for #. Thus the !s are plausible model-building material
nonetheless, they don't yet have all the properties we want.
First there's a small wrinkle: we would like the MCSs we use to be labeled
by a nominal , not just a free variable this isn't crucial, but it saves having to
worry about about accidental binding. But note that even if ; itself contains
a nominal (say i), we have no guarantee that all the !s do too: for example,
; may contain @x:j for all nominals j , in which case !x won't contain any
nominals at all, though of course it will contain x.
And there's a second, far more serious, problem. Suppose we take the collection of !s yielded by a labeled MCS as the building blocks of our model. Doing
this means we have thrown away MCSs we will be working in a submodel of the
canonical model. How do we know that a modal style Existence Lemma holds
for this submodel? That is, how can prove the clause of the Truth Lemma for
the modalities? Bluntly, there is no obvious way to do this.
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The Paste rules enable us to x both problems. Here they are:
` @s 3(t ^ ') ! 
` @s (t ^ ') ! 
` @s ' ! 
` @s 3' ! 
The rule on the left is called Paste-0, the rule on the right Paste-1. In both, t
must be a state symbol distinct from s that does not occur in ' or .
The key rule is Paste-1. Read contrapositively (that is, read from bottom
to top) it tells is that pasting a brand new state symbol under the scope of 3
is a consistency preserving operation | for if we can't derive a contradiction
(that is, ) without the new nominal, then we can't derive the contradiction
after we have pasted. We shall leave the reader to ponder the simpler Paste-0
rule (essentially it says that giving a brand new name to a labeled state isn't
going to cause any problems) and prove the Extended Lindenbaum's Lemma we
need.11
De nition 7 (Pasted MCSs) An MCS ; is 0-pasted i @s' 2 ; implies
that for some nominal i, @s (i ^ ') 2 ;. It is 1-pasted i @s 3' 2 ; implies
that for some nominal i, @s 3(i ^ ') 2 ;. We say that ; is pasted i it is both
0-pasted and 1-pasted.
Lemma 8 (Extended Lindenbaum's Lemma) Let L and L+ be countable
languages such that L+ is L enriched with a countably innite set of new nominals. Then every consistent set of L-formulas can be extended to a pasted
L+ -MCS that is labeled by a nominal.
Proof. Enumerate the new nominals. Given a consistent set of L-formulas ",
de ne "j to be " fj g, where j is the rst new nominal. "j is consistent.
For suppose not. Then for some conjunction of formulas  from " we have
that ` j ! : as j is from the new-nominal enumeration, it does not occur
in . Let P be a proof of ` j ! : and let x be any state variable that
does not appear in this proof. Then replacing every occurrence of j in P by x
yields a proof of ` x ! :. Localization then yields ` #x(x ! :). By Q3,
` #x: . Now vacuous occurrences of the # binder are eliminable in H# @](K )
(for ` :' ! :', so for any variable x not occurring in ', localization and Q1
yield ` :' ! #x:', whereupon contraposition and the self duality of # yield
the result). Hence ` :, which contradicts the consistency of ". Thus "j is
consistent after all.
We now paste. Enumerate all the formulas of L+ , de ne #0 to be "j , and
suppose we have de ned #m , where m  0. Let 'm+1 be the m +1-th formula in
The extended version of this paper discusses the admissibility of these rules. A semantic
argument is given which strongly suggests that Paste-0 isn't a genuine enrichment of the
system, though at the time of writing this hadn't been backed up by a syntactic proof. The
admissibility of Paste-1 is posed as an open problem.
But while interesting, to focus exclusively on the admissibility of Paste-1 over an axiomatic
basis is to miss the true signicance of this rule: Paste-1 is actually the most natural part
of H# @](K ) | it's the other components that should be eliminated! This is the strategy
adopted in Blackburn and Seligman (1998). Drawing on ideas from Seligman (1997) an @based sequent system is presented and the idea underlying Paste-1 nds its true home.
Incidentally, Paste-1 is closely related to a rule introduced by Gabbay and Hodkinson (1990)
for Until -Since logic. The Gabbay and Hodkinson method is discussed in detail in the extended version of the paper, and Paste-1 is introduced as, so to speak, an @-based implementation of their idea that bypasses the need to work with arbitrary sequences of tense
operators.
11
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our enumeration. We de ne #m+1 as follows. If #m+1 f'm+1 g is inconsistent,
then #m+1 = #m. Otherwise:
1. #m+1 = #m f'm+1 g if 'm+1 is not of the form @v v or @s 3'. Here s
is a state symbol, and v is a state variable.
2. #m+1 = #m f'm+1 g f@v (k ^ v)g, if 'm+1 is of the form @v v. Here k
is the next new nominal that does not occur in #m .
3. #m+1 = #m f'm+1 g f@s 3(k ^ ')g, if 'm+1 is of the form @s 3'. Here
k is the next new nominal that does not occur in #m or @s 3'.

S

Let # = n 0 #n . It is clear that this set is labeled by a nominal, maximal, and 1-pasted. Furthermore, it must be consistent, for the only non-trivial
aspects of the expansion are those de ned by items 2 and 3, and Paste-0 and
Paste-1 respectively guarantee that these are consistency preserving.
So it only remains to check that # is 0-pasted because of the rather limited
way item 2 uses Paste-0 this may not be entirely obvious. First, note that by
basic modal reasoning ` @s  ^ @s  ! @s ( ^ ). So suppose @s ' 2 $. If s
is a nominal, say i, then because @i i is an axiom, @i (i ^ ') 2 $ as required.
On the other hand, if s is a variable, say x, then because of the pasting process
carried out in item 2, for some nominal i we have that @x (i ^ x) 2 #. As @s is
a normal modal operator, @xi 2 #, so @x (i ^ ') 2 $. We conclude that # is
the required L+ -MCS. a


We're now ready to prove the completeness of H# @](K ) | in fact we have
everything we need to prove the completeness of many of its extensions as well.

De nition 9 (Labeled models and natural assignments) Let ; be a pasted

MCS labeled by a nominal. For all state symbols s, let !s be f' j @s ' 2 ;g,
and dene S to be f!s j s is a state symbolg. Then we dene M, the labeled
model yielded by ;, to be (S R V ), where R and V are the restrictions of Rc
(the canonical relation) and V c (the canonical valuation) to S . We dene the
natural assignment g : SVAR ;! S by g(x) = fs 2 S j x 2 sg.

Such labeled models have all the structure we want. For a start, by Clause 3
of Lemma 6, ; 2 S , and by Clause 5, V is a standard valuation and g is a
standard assignment. Further, all states in the model contain nominals (because
; is 0-pasted), and hence are well-behaved as far as # is concerned. Moreover,
we know from Lemma 6 that M is extremely well-behaved with respect to @.
So it only remains to ensure that such models are well-behaved with respect to
the modalities that is, we want an Existence Lemma. This, of course, is where
1-pasting comes in:

Lemma 10 (Existence Lemma) Let M = (S R V ) be the labeled model
yielded by a pasted set ; that is labeled by some nominal. Suppose # 2 S
and 3' 2 #. Then there is a " 2 M such that #R" and ' 2 ".
Proof. As # 2 S , for some nominal i we have that # = !i hence as 3' 2 #,
@i 3' 2 ;. But ; is pasted (and hence 1-pasted) so for some nominal k,
@i 3(k ^ ') 2 ;, and so 3(k ^ ') 2 !i . If we could show that (1) !i R!k ,
and (2) ' 2 !k , then !k would be a suitable choice of ". And in fact Bridge
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and Back , aided by the @-agreement property of our model (that is, item 2 of
Lemma 6) will let us establish this.
For (1), we need to show that for any  2 !k , we have that 3 2 !i . So
suppose  2 !k . This means that @k  2 ;. By @-agreement, @k  2 !i . But
3k 2 !i . Hence, by Bridge, 3 2 !i as required.
For (2), we know that 3(k ^ ') 2 !i . But ` k ^ ' ! @k ' (this is an
instance of Introduction ), hence 3@k ' 2 !i . But then, by Back , @k ' 2 !i .
By @-agreement, @k ' 2 ;. Hence ' 2 !k as required. a

Lemma 11 (Truth Lemma) Let # be an MCS in M. For all formulas ',
'2#i

M # j= '.

Proof. By induction: the atomic, boolean, and modal steps are standard (we
use the Existence Lemma just proved for the latter).
So suppose #x 2 !. Since ! contains a nominal (say i), by Q2 i=x] 2 !.
By the inductive hypothesis M  g ! j= i=x]. Thus, M  g ! j= i ^ i=x], and
by the contrapositive of the Q2 axiom, M  g ! j= #x. For the other direction
assume M  g ! j= #x. That is, M  g  ! j= , where g x g such that
g (x) = f!g. Now ! contains a nominal, say i, so by the Substitution Lemma,
M  g ! j=  i=x], hence by the inductive hypothesis  i=x] 2 !. So, by the
contrapositive of the Q2 axiom, #x is in ! as required.
The argument for @ runs as follows: M # j= @s  i M !s j=  (for by
Clause 5 of Lemma 6, !s is the only MCS containing s, and hence, by the the
atomic case of the present lemma, the only state in M where s is true) i  2 !s
(inductive hypothesis) i @s  2 !s (using the fact that s 2 !s together with
Introduction for the left-to-right direction and Elimination for the right-to-left
direction) i @s  2 # (by the @-agreement property for the MCSs in S ). Thus
all cases have been proved, and the Truth Lemma follows by induction. a
0

0

0

Theorem 12 (Completeness) Every H# @](K )-consistent set of formulas

in a countable language L is satisable in a countable standard model with respect
to a standard assignment function. Moreover, every H# @](K )-consistent set
of sentences in L is satisable in a countable connected standard model
Proof. The rst is proved in the expected way: given a H# @](K )-consistent set
of formulas $, use the Extended Lindenbaum Lemma to expand it to a pasted
set $+ labeled by some nominal in a countable language L+ . By the Truth
Lemma just proved, the labeled model and natural assignment that $+ gives
rise to satisfy $ at $+ . This model need not be connected, but the submodel
generated by $+ is, and all sentences in $+ are true in this submodel. a

But there's no need to stop here | one of the nicest things about hybrid languages is the ease with which general completeness results for richer logics can
be proved.12 Moreover, such results typically link completeness and framedenability in a very straightforward way.
12 Historically, this has been a major motivation for exploring hybrid languages. Bull (1970)
points out (see page 285), that all state-symbol-based extensions of the basic logic are complete, and a neat argument to the same e ect is given at the end of Gargov, Passy and
Tinchev (1987). Passy and Tinchev (1991) push matters further like the earlier Passy and
Tinchev (1985), this paper takes PDL as the underlying modal language and explores what
happens beyond the rst-order barrier. The present paper applies similar arguments to weaker
local languages.
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A formula is said to dene some property of frames (for example, transitivity) i it is valid on precisely the frames with that property (recall from
Section 2 that a formula is valid on a frame i it is impossible to falsify it at
any state in that frame, no matter which valuation or assignment is used). The
sort of results we are after have roughly the following form: for any formula '
from some speci ed syntactic class, if ' de nes a property P , then using it as
an additional axiom guarantees completeness with respect to the class of frames
with property P . For ordinary modal languages, the Sahlqvist Theorems are the
best known result of this type (see Sahlqvist (1975)) as we shall see, analogous
results for hybrid languages come far more easily. We shall give two. The idea
underlying both is the same: stop thinking in terms of propositional variables,
and start thinking in terms of state symbols.
We say that a formula of ML+#+@ is pure i it contains no propositional
variables our rst result concerns pure sentences . As the following examples
show, pure sentences are remarkably expressive each sentence de nes the property listed to its right. All these properties are relevant to temporal reasoning,
and (with the exception of transitivity and density) none are de nable in ordinary modal logic:
#x2:x

Irreexivity

#x22:x

Asymmetry

#x2(3x ! x)

Antisymmetry

#x2#y @x 33y

Density

#x22#y @x 3y

Transitivity

#x3#y @x (22:y ^ 2#z @y (z _ 3z ))

Discreteness

The last three expressions can be simpli ed using +n notation.13
Let us say that a pure sentential axiomatic extension of H# @](K ) is any
system obtained by adding as axioms a set of pure sentences of ML+#+@.

Theorem 13 (Extended Completeness I) Let Pure be a set of pure sentences of ML+#+@, and let P be the pure sentential axiomatic extension of
H# @](K ) obtained by adding all sentences in Pure as axioms. Then every
P -consistent set of formulas in a countable language L is satisable in a countable standard model, based on a frame that validates every axiom in Pure, with
respect to a standard assignment function. Moreover, every consistent set of
sentences in L is satisable in a countable connected standard model based on
a frame that validates Pure.
13 This notation was introduced in Footnote 9. The denition of density can be rewritten
as +1y 33y (\every state y that can be reached in one step can be reached in two steps"),
the denition of transitivity is +2y 3y (\every state y that can be reached in two steps can be
reached in one step"), while discreteness simplies to #1y (22:y ^ +1z @y (z _ 3z )) (\there is a
successor state y, that is not 2-step reachable, from which any successor state z is 0- or 1-step
reachable").
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Proof. An easy corollary of Theorem 12: given a P -consistent set of formulas
$, build a satisfying model by expanding $ to a set $+ in a countable language
L+ , and forming the labeled model M = (S R V ) and the natural assignment
g. Now, the labeled model is built of MCSs, and each axiom in Pure belongs
to every P -MCS, thus by the Truth Lemma, M g j= Pure. But as Pure contains only sentences, the choice of assignment is irrelevant, hence M j= Pure.
Moreover, as Pure contains only pure sentences, the choice of valuation is also
irrelevant, and (S R) j= Pure. This proves the rst claim. Finally, if $ contains
only sentences, we obtain a connected model by restricting our attention to the
submodel generated by $+ the underlying subframe validates Pure. a

As a simple application, note that we obtain the logic of strictly partially
ordered frames (which many writers, for example van Benthem (1983), would
regard as the minimal temporal logic) by adding as axioms #x2:x and +2y 3y
the previous theorem guarantees that the labeled model validates these axioms,
hence as they de ne irreexivity and transitivity respectively, the labeled model
will have these properties.
This is pleasant, but let's push things further. Theorem 13 requires us to
use sentences as axioms. However it can be more natural to use pure schemas .
Consider, for example, the schema 33s ! 3s. Any instance of this schema
de nes transitivity, and it is easy to verify that including all instances as axioms
guarantees a transitive labeled model. Similarly, any instance of the schema

3s ^ 3t ! 3(s ^ 3t) _ 3(s ^ t) _ 3(t ^ 3s)]
de nes the no-branching-to-the-right property, and including all instances as
axioms guarantees a labeled model with this property. Both transitivity and
no-branching-to-the-right are de nable using pure sentences,14 but the use of
schemas can oer more. A simple example is the schema 3s any instance of
this de nes the class of frames (S R) such that R = S  S , and its inclusion as
an axiom schema imposes this property on labeled models.15
A pure schematic extension of H# @](K ) is any system obtained by adding
all ML+#+@ instances of a set of pure schemas of ML+#+@ as axioms to
H# @](K ).

Theorem 14 (Extended Completeness II) Let

Schemas be a set of pure
schemas of ML+#+@, and let S be the pure schematic extension of H# @](K )
obtained by adding all instances of the schemas in Schemas as axioms. Then
every S -consistent set of sentences in a countable language L is satisable in
a countable standard model, based on a frame that validates all these axioms,
with respect to a standard assignment function. Moreover, every consistent set
of sentences in L is satisable in a countable connected standard model based
on a frame that validates all these axioms.

Proof. See the extended version of this paper. a
14 The pure sentence +1 +1 (3y ^ 3z ! 3(y ^ 3z ) _ 3(y ^ z ) _ 3(z ^ 3y )]) denes noy z

branching-to-the-right.
15 We don't know many temporally relevant examples in ML+#+@ that require the use
of schemas, but examples are easy to nd in tense logic enriched with #. For example, the
schema P s _ s _ F s guarantees trichotomy (that is, 8xy(xRy _ x = y _ yRx)), while PF s
guarantees us left-directedness (that is, 8xy9z (zRx ^ zRy).
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What sort of coverage do Theorems 13 and 14 oer? For a start, note that
all our examples of frame properties de nable by pure sentences or (instances
of) pure schemas were rst-order. This is no accident: a simple extension of
the Standard Translation for the basic modal language shows that every pure
formula of ML+#+@ de nes a rst-order condition on frames. The Standard
Translation for the basic modal language is de ned as follows:

STx(p)
STx(:')
STx(' ^ )
STx(2')

Px for all propositional symbols p
:STx (')
STx(') ^ STx(')
8y (xRy ! STy ('))

=
=
=
=

(In the rst clause, P is a monadic second-order predicate variable each propositional symbol corresponds uniquely to such a symbol.) Following Blackburn
and Seligman (1998), we extend this translation to ML+#+@ as follows: we
assume that the rst-order variables we have available consist of all the usual
state variables, plus a distinct variable xi for each nominal i and de ne:

STx(y)
STx(i)
STx(#x')
STx(@y ')

x = y for all state variables y
x = xi  for all nominals i
9y (x = y ^ STx ('))
STy (')
Suppose ' is a formula of ML+#+@ we suppose that ' has been -converted
so that it contains no occurrences of the variable x (we reserve this variable to
denote the current state). It is easy to see that STx(') will contain at least
one free variable (namely x). It is also easy to see that this extended version of
ST preserves satisfaction. That is for any ML+#+@ formula ', any standard
model M = (S R V ), any standard assignment g, and any s 2 S :
M s g j= ' i M j= STx (')s g(z) V(i) V(p)]:
=
=
=
=

The notation on the right means: assign s to the free variable x, assign the
unique element of g(z ) to z if z occurs free in the translation, assign the unique
element of V (i) to xi if xi occurs free in the translation, and assign V (p) to P
if P is a monadic predicate variable that occurs free in the translation. Now we
can see why it pays to be pure: if ' contains no propositional variables, then
the previous expression simpli es to
M g s j= '

i M j= STx(')s g(z) V(i)]:

We are now rmly in the world of rst order logic. But let's carry on. We have:
M g j= '

i M j= 8xSTx(')g(z) V(i)]

and hence:

(S R) j= ' i (S R) j= 8z1    8zn8xSTx('):
On the righthand side we have simply universally quanti ed over all the freevariables in 8xSTx('). In short, the frame property any pure formula de nes can
be calculated by applying the standard translation and forming the universal
closure. Thus Theorem 13 and 14 bear a certain family resemblance to the
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Sahlqvist Theorems: all these results cover rst-order properties which can be
eectively calculated from the relevant axioms.
There are a host of related questions worth pursuing. For example, we have
seen many examples of rst-order properties which are not modally de nable but
which are de nable using pure formulas can all modally de nable rst-order
conditions be captured in this way? And if not, can all Sahlqvist de nable
properties be so captured?16

5 Working with other sorts
Our technical work is done, but our conceptual work is not. The reader may have
gained the impression that hybridization is simply the business of quantifying
over states in a modal setting. But while that's part of the story, and an
important part too, we believe that a more general idea deserves to be made
explicit.
Our preceding work rested on a simple idea: combining two forms of information in a uniform way. Our languages dealt with arbitrary information (via
the propositional symbols) and labeling information (via the state symbols) and
yet we drew no distinction between terms and formulas both types of information were handled propositionally. Now the natural question is: if this works for
state-label information, why shouldn't it work for other types of information as
well? For example, in some applications we might want to work with intervals,
or events, or paths, or some combination of these entities | so why not introduce special atomic symbols that label such entities and allow ourselves to bind
them? In short, why not attempt hybridization in more ambitious ways?17
Intriguingly, there are at least two ways of doing this. The rst involves little
change to the work of previous sections. For example, working with intervals
in a modal logic standardly means working with richer frames, perhaps frames
of the form (S < v). Here S is thought of as a set of intervals, < as the
precedence relation on intervals, and v as the inclusion relation on intervals.18
16 There are rst-order properties which are modally denable but not Sahlqvist denable,
which can be dened by pure sentences. For example, transitivity + atomicity (8x9y(xRy ^
8z (yRz ! z = y))) is denable by the conjunction of the modal transitivity axiom (33p !
3p) and the McKinsey formula (23p ! 32p), but no Sahlqvist formula denes this condition.
Incidentally, McKinsey does not dene atomicity, and in fact, no ordinary modal formula does
so only transitivity + atomicity is modally denable. But the following pure sentence denes
atomicity: 3#y2y. We have already seen that transitivity is denable by a pure sentence.
17 In suggesting this we are merely echoing Arthur Prior, for this idea was an important |
perhaps the dominant | theme in his later work the key reference here is the posthumous
Prior and Fine (1977), which consists of draft chapters of a book, together with papers, and an
invaluable appendix by Kit Fine which attempts to systematically reconstruct Prior's views.
Prior attached immense philosophical weight to this project in his view it showed that that
possible worlds were not needed to analyze modal notions and indeed, that times were not
needed to analyze temporal expressions. Only (suitably sorted) propositions (and properties)
mattered.
Prior's philosophical position is interesting: it is strongly information oriented, has natural
anities with frameworks such as Property Theory and Situation Semantics, and deserves
further exploration. Nonetheless, here we prefer to adopt a neutral perspective on the philosophical signicance of hybrid languages: for present purposes, they are simply an elegant tool
for talking about structures locally, and adding further sorts is simply an interesting technical
idea.
18 Various constraints would be imposed to make this interpretation plausible. Typically we
would demand that (S <) be a strict partial order, that (S v) be partial order, and that <
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Or perhaps we'd prefer working with frames bearing the 14 relations demanded
in Allen (1984). Either way, the fundamental point is that we are enriching
our notion of what a state is by locating it in a richer web of relations. This
mode of enrichment is obviously compatible with the methods discussed earlier
for example, it is straightforward to work with Allen-style intervals using # and
@.19 Such an approach naturally leads to multi-sorted systems. For example, if
we wanted to work with atomic interval structures, it would be natural to have
a sort which labeled arbitrary intervals, and a subsort which labeled atomic
intervals (see Blackburn (1992)).
But there is another way of developing multi-sorted hybrid languages. This
hinges on the following observation: some entities can be thought of as structured sets of states. For example, an interval is the set of all states between two
end points.20 Why not add atomic symbols that range over such sets? After all,
we already have propositional symbols ranging over arbitrary subsets, and statesymbols ranging over singleton subsets | so why not symbols that range over
convex sets too? This is arguably a useful idea (see Blackburn (1990,1992,1993))
and it is certainly simple to handle logically.21 But to illustrate the structuredset approach to sorting in more detail we want to discuss not intervals but
paths , because this example not only provides a nice illustration of the potential of sorting for temporal logic, it also makes clear that even simple-looking
extensions can give rise to non-trivial problems.
Many applications of temporal logic demand the use of paths , or courses
of history . For example, for philosophical purposes it is natural to model the
idea that the future is unknown by using tree-like models of time that branch
into alternative futures, and in computer science it is standard to reason about
unravelings of non-deterministic transition systems. On the face of it, these
applications only seem to demand that we work with new classes of tree-like
models, and clearly we can do that with the tools we already have. But this is
only half the story. As well as new models, we are faced with new expressive
demands, and these will lead us to new territory.
For example, in natural language semantics we would like to have a future
tense operator F such that F ' is true precisely when ' holds somewhere in every
possible future (that is, when ' holds at least once on every path through the
current state). However we can't de ne F in any of our hybrid languages even
abandoning locality and working with ML+8+A doesn't help. As a second
example consider fairness. In computer science applications we may want to
insist that a process is activated in nitely often along every possible computation
and v interacted appropriately (for example, we'd want 8stt ((s v t ^ t < t ) ! :s v t )) see
van Benthem (1983) for further discussion.
19 The `straightforward' is justied: many of the frame properties required are expressible
by pure sentences or schemas, hence completeness will often be automatic. For example, #xv
]G#y@x :Fy regulates the interaction of < and v (here v] means \at all super-intervals").
As a second example, we have already noted that atomicity (which we may want for v) is
enforceable using a pure sentence (see Footnote 15). It would be interesting to compare an #and @-based treatment with Yde Venema's two-dimensional analysis (see Venema (1990)).
20 Of course, one might want to distinguish between various types of intervals, such as open
and closed, but we won't do so here.
21 Readers familiar with the representation theorems for abstract interval structures in terms
of point-based structures proved in van Benthem (1983) will (rightly) suspect that in many
cases this structured-set approach to hybrid interval logic will turn out to be equivalent to
the additional-relations approach. Incidentally, this `duality' between the additional-relations
and the structured-set approaches may be relevant for paths too.
0
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path but our state symbols won't help us de ne a fairness operator. Thus we
have a genuine expressivity shortcoming on our hands. Let's try to x it by
hybridization.22
The basic strategy for dealing with paths in hybrid languages should be
clear. First we add a third sort, the sort of path symbols (presumably we want
to keep the state symbols, though this of course is optional). As with state
symbols, path symbols should be divided into two subcategories, namely path
variables (which will be open to binding) and path nominals (which will not).
So we choose PVAR to be a countably in nite set of path variables (whose
elements we typically write as and ) and PNOM to be a countably in nite
set of path nominals (whose elements we typically write as and ), and of
course we choose these sets to be disjoint from each other and from PROP,
SVAR, and NOM. We de ne the set of atoms of our enriched language to be
PROP SVAR NOM PVAR PNOM.
The second step is to add a binder. We shall add a binder called + , thus
forming the language ML+ # +@+ + . As the notation is meant to suggest, + is
a universal quanti er over paths through the current state (that is, `local paths').
The ws of this language are de ned in the expected way, as are such concepts
as free and bound path variables, so let's proceed straight to the semantics.
We shall work with strictly partially ordered trees (S R), and adopt Bull's
de nition of a path: a path in (S R) is a linearly ordered subset of S that
is maximal among the linearly ordered subsets of S . That is, paths are convex
subsets of S that contain the root node and are closed under R-successorship.
We denote the set of paths in (S R) by %(S R). If 2 %(S R) and s 2 then
we say that passes through s. Obviously %(S R) is never empty, and at least
one path passes through every state.
De nition 15 (Standard models and assignments) Let ML + # + @ + +
be a hybrid language built over PROP, SVAR, NOM, PVAR and PNOM. A
model M for this language is a triple (S R V ) such that (S R) is a strictly
partially ordered tree, and V : PROP NOM PNOM ;! Pow (S ). A model
is called standard i for all nominals i 2 NOM, V (i) is a singleton subset of S ,
and for all path nominals 2 PNOM, V ( ) 2 %(S R).
An assignment on M is a mapping g : SVAR PVAR ;! Pow(S ). An
assignment is called standard i for all state variables x 2 SVAR, g(x) is a
singleton subset of S , and for all path variables 2 PNOM, V ( ) 2 %(S R).
Now to interpret the language. The atomic clause is automatically taken
care of by our V g] notation, and the clauses for the Booleans and modalities
are unchanged. So it only remains to interpret + :
0

0


M g s j= + ' i M g 0  s j= ' for all g 0  g such that s 2 g 0 ( ):
That is, + is a universal quanti er over local paths the dual binder # ' is an

existential quanti er over local paths.

22 We are not the rst to do this. Motivated by Prior's arguments, Robert Bull added a
universal quantier over paths to TL+8+A in his classic 1970 paper thus, far from being
the new kid on the block, hybridization is actually one of the oldest approaches to pathbased reasoning we know of. A recent paper by Goranko on hybrid languages strong enough
to embed CTL (see Goranko (1996b)) is worth noting Goranko's language doesn't contain
path binders, but it does contain path nominals.
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It is easy to see that sentences of this language are preserved under generated
submodels. Moreover, the expressivity has clearly been boosted. For example,
we can now de ne the F operator:
F'

:= + 3( ^ '):

It is also straightforward to de ne a fairness operator:
Fair(') := + (3( ^ ') ^ 2(( ^ ') ! 3( ^ ')):

At any state s in a standard model, Fair(') is true at a state s i ' is true
in nitely often along every path through s.
Moreover, familiar-looking principles of hybrid reasoning extend to our new
binder. For example, the rule of path variable localization (if ' is provable then
so is + ', for any path variable ) preserves validity, and all instances of the
following three schemas are valid:
Q1

+ (' !  ) ! (' ! +  )

Q2

+ ' ! (p ! 'p=

Q3

+ ( !  ) ! + 

Local-Path

#

])

(Here and p are used as metavariables across path variables and path symbols
respectively. In Q1, must not be free in ' and in Q2, p must be substitutable
for in '.) In short, the basic quanti cational powers of + described by Q1{Q3
are analogous to those of #, and Local-Path is analogous to the validity #xx.
Moreover, we have a Barcan analog:23
Barcan
+ 2' ! 2+ '
The contraposed and dualised form 3# ' ! # 3' is perhaps easier to grasp.
Essentially this says: \if we can select a suitable path at a successor state,
then we can select a suitable path at the current state" it is a path existence
principle.
Our language also supports schemas that reect path geometry (we use p
as a metavariable over path symbols and s and t as metavariable over state
nominals):
P1 3p ! p
P2 p ^ 3> ! 3p
P3 3(s ^ p) ^ 3(t ^ p) ! 3(s ^ 3t) _ 3(s ^ t) _ 3(t ^ 3s)
23 The signicance of this may not be apparent to readers of this short version. Roughly
speaking, in hybrid languages the validity of Barcan analogs is often a sign that the logic will
be well-behaved. For further discussion, see Blackburn and Tzakova (1998a), the extended
version of the present paper.
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Clearly P1 reects convexity, P2 reects R-maximality under successorship, and
P3 reects linearity note the way the state and path symbols cooperate here.
Summing up, in many ways ML + # + @ + + is a pleasant language.
That's the good part | let's turn to the bad. It seems that proving completeness results for + will require new ideas the labeled model method used
in the previous section does not automatically give us completeness results for
the new binder, or at least, not with respect to the standard semantics de ned
above. What's the problem? It's simple, but deadly: although the labeled
model construction will guarantee that all states are labeled, we don't have any
guarantee that all paths will be labeled by some path symbol.24
This is not easy to x. What are we to do? Robert Bull makes an interesting
remark. He comments (see his Footnote 5 on page 292) that although not every
path is the interpretation of some path symbol, his model:
. . . does provide enough paths V(u) to give a reasonable interpretation.
With this remark, Bull hints at a line of work that has subsequently become
common in path-based temporal logic. All reasonably expressive path-based
logics we know of (for example, Ockhamist logic or CTL ) face similar difculties regarding completeness. A standard response to the problem is to
prove completeness with respect to some suitably liberalized notion of model,
for example models containing `bundles' of paths (see Zanardo (1996)) such approaches have a'nities with the use of generalized models in second-order logic,
or general frames in modal logic. We believe it would be interesting to explore
this landscape using hybrid path languages, and suspect that the labeled model
construction may be useful in such investigations.
But what of the standard semantics de ned above? This may call for a
more brutal line of approach: the use of in nitary rules. Intuitively what is
needed is an in nitary extension of the Local-Path schema. From Local-Path
we can deduce that there is a path through the current state what we also
need is a principle that ensures that given a sequence of states (one of which
is the current state) that satis es the convexity, R-maximality, and linearity
principles, then there is a path nominal that is true at all the states in this
sequence. In nitary rules are unpalatable | but a clean in nitary approach
may provide a framework which can (at least, in some cases of interest) be
suitably nitized however we must admit that at present we don't know how
realistic the prospects of success here are.
And that's a taste of the joys and sorrows of hybrid path languages. We have
only scratched the surface of a vast topic, but we hope we have said enough to
indicate why we nd this terrain worthy of further exploration. Moreover, we
hope we have given the reader a taste of the variety of options hybridization
oers to the study of rich temporal ontologies.


Incidentally, we're not claiming that adding the axioms and rules mentioned above to
yields a system complete with respect to the standard semantics | it's obvious
that it doesn't. Rather, the point is that even after we plug up all the obvious gaps with
suitable axioms, we'll still face a tough problem. For further discussion, see the extended
version.
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6 Concluding remarks
We have argued that the hybridization technique introduced by Arthur Prior
and developed by Robert Bull and the So a School is a natural tool for temporal
logic. Our argument had both a technical and conceptual side.
Our technical results showed that hybridization is compatible with a temporally natural locality assumption, namely that temporal operators and binders
should only be able to work with temporally accessible states. We showed that
ML+#+@, a local language in which Until was de nable, had an elegant minimal logic and that many temporally interesting extended completeness results
could be obtained automatically. In our view, this language meets the three
criteria listed at the end of Section 2 in particular, we feel it exhibits a genuine
synergy of modal and classical ideas.
It's only fair to warn the reader that we pay a price for this synergy:
H# @](K ) lacks the nite model and is undecidable, and the same is true
of the logic of strict partial orders.25 Of course, the logics of many interesting
frame classes are decidable (for example, the logics of various classes of trees
can be proved decidable using Rabin-style arguments see Blackburn and Seligman (1998)), nonetheless the fact remains that binding variables to states tilts
the underlying computational properties rmly in the classical direction.
But we believe this is a price worth paying. Labeled deductive systems
(Fitting (1983), Gabbay (1992)) have proved an important technique for automating modal inference | but labels are usually regarded as a convenient (if
somewhat ad-hoc ) metalinguistic tool. Labels are far more important than that
indeed, if Prior is right, they are fundamental to the entire modal enterprise.
Hybrid languages internalize the notion of label in the object language, and
this internalization can be motivated on grounds that are completely independent of the desire for deductive felicity. Nonetheless, as the use of the Paste-1
rule already indicates (see Footnote 11) deductive felicity is there for the taking: Seligman (1997) discusses natural deduction and sequent-based methods
for global hybrid languages containing both 8 and @, and Blackburn and Seligman (1998a) shows that these methods can be adapted even to weak (decidable)
languages that contain no binders at all. In our view the deductive and conceptual clarity oered by internalized labels is more than ample compensation for
the undecidability results just noted.
Our main conceptual argument in favor of hybridization is essentially a secular version of Prior's vision of abstract entities as propositions. That is, we feel
that regardless of whether there is an interesting metaphysical sense in which
arbitrary information types should be thought of propositionally, freely combining dierent sorts of information in one modal algebra is a natural way of
modeling temporal reasoning over rich ontologies.
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